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It is an honor to be a keynote speaker at this important gathering.  Personally, this is a 
special meeting as I contributed, together with Barry Eichengreen, Takatoshi Ito, and Charles 
Wyplosz, to the writing of the first report for this series of conferences back in 1999.  It was lots of 
fun and an intellectual pleasure to work with such a great team of colleagues, and in such an 
important issue.  In that first Geneva Report we wrote about the need to reform the IMF giving it 
independence, such as what we praise for central banks, and accountability, an essential element to 
make independence effective.  In the future I would like to develop further on those issues; 
however, today I will focus on an even more pressing debate in the recent macro juncture: monetary 
policy, stability and the current risks of an outburst of inflation around the world, which is precisely 
the subject of this conference.  
 
I will first refer to the Great Moderation, an expression in use to describe the decline in 
output and inflation volatility of industrial countries in the last twenty years.  There has been 
significant research on the factors behind this phenomenon, better monetary policy being one of 
them.  I will argue that in developing countries the Great Moderation was achieved about ten years 
ago and coincidentally with the conquest of low inflation.  The timing of events supports the 
hypothesis of a causal relationship from inflation control to decreased output and inflation volatility.  
Thus, improvements in monetary policy contribute to obtaining not only price stability but also 
output stability, or smoothed business cycles.  I will argue that the long time that passed between 
the great moderation in industrial countries and developing ones, cast doubts on the validity and 
generality of hypotheses based on common positive shocks (“good luck”), such as the decline in oil 
prices and technological improvement (e.g., better inventory management). 
  
The second issue I will address is the prospect for maintaining stability in a context of 
severe inflationary risks.  Indeed, in the last quarters we have witnessed one of the largest 
inflationary shock in the post-World War II period.  This is the biggest threat we have encountered 
to the impressive achievement of stable business cycles and low/stable inflation.  Up to now, the 
shock has had enormous effects on the poor, as the prices of basic foodstuff have increased sharply. 
In addition, if inflation persists, the cost along the business cycle may become excruciating. I will 
close with some thoughts on the challenges ahead for monetary policy. 
 
 
The Great Moderation 
 
The substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility we have witnessed in the US and the 
world during the last decades has been widely documented by a substantial body of empirical 
research. Kim and Nelson (1999) and Blanchard and Simon (2001) were among the first to point at 
                                                 
∗ Keynote speech delivered at the 10th Geneva Conference on the World Economy, May 6, 2008.  I am very 
grateful to Christopher Neilson and Andrea Tokman for their great contributions and suggestions.   2
this phenomena which later became known as the Great Moderation. These latter authors found, for 
the US, that the variability of quarterly growth in real output had declined by half since the mid-
1980s, while the variability of inflation had declined by about two thirds.
 Similar declines in the 
volatility of output and inflation occurred in most other G-7 countries roughly around the mid-
eighties (Smith and Summers, 2002, and Stock and Watson, 2003). 
 
While we know that the control of inflation was achieved by the actions of monetary policy 
in the US, there is still an ongoing discussion regarding what caused the persistent decline in both 
output and inflation volatility. In general, the different reasons can be separated into three groups: 
 
•  The first argument is that the Great Moderation is the result of smaller and less frequent shocks 
hitting the economy.  This would imply that the observed reduction in macroeconomic volatility 
would be the result of good fortune and would thus only last until bad luck or larger shocks 
were to re-appear.  Several studies have provided support for the “good-luck hypothesis” 
(Ahmed, et al., 2002). 
 
•  A second related explanation is focused on structural and technological changes which are 
permanent in nature, but were not directly caused or controlled by macroeconomic policies. For 
example, a special type of technological progress frequently mentioned in the discussion of 
output volatility refers to the improved management of inventories.  If a significant part of the 
business cycle dynamics occurs through inventory fluctuations, “just in time” technologies and 
better management of inventories in general would reduce volatility along the business cycle 
(McConnell and Perez-Quiroz, 2000; Cecchetti et al., 2005).  Another important structural 
change is related to worldwide economic integration and globalization, as reviewed in the 
Geneva Report prepared for this conference (Gerlach et al., 2008). Cavallo (2007), for example, 
emphasizes that trade openness has reduced output volatility, and hence, more open economies 
are also more stable.  This evidence refutes the old view that more open economies are more 
exposed to volatility.  On the contrary, Cavallo (2007) argues that more open economies have 
more opportunities to adjust to international shocks.  Following this argument, the notable 
increase in openness all around the world would make all countries more stable.
1  
 
•  A third and final factor which I would like to emphasize is related to improved monetary policy.  
These reforms have resulted in the reduction of not only inflation levels, but also its volatility. 
Figure 1 shows average growth and inflation over an ample set of developing countries,
2 while 
figure 2 shows the volatility of output and inflation.  It can be seen that volatility declined in 
developing economies towards the mid-nineties. This is almost a decade after the developed 
economies experienced their “Great Moderation”. Thus, we can say that this evidence suggests 
there is a timing mismatch between the great moderation of developed and developing 
economies.  
 
The “good luck” hypothesis and the explanations based on structural factors cannot 
properly account for this phenomenon.  If volatility had fallen only due to good luck, then luck 
itself should have only been good for developed countries in the mid 1980s, which then took more 
than 10 years to arrive to help developing ones!  Similarly, the argument of increased productivity, 
                                                 
1 Kent et al. (2005) examine also the role of reforms in product and labor markets on output volatility for a 
sample of 20 OECD countries.  For evidence in the case of Chile and estimations of reduced-form VARs, see 
Betancour et al. (2008). 
2 Seventy three economies classified as developing in the IFS data base and containing information since 
1975.  The figures are simple unweighted averages.  
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such as better inventory management, has similar problems. It is difficult to think that businesses in 
developing countries adopted these better techniques more than 10 years later.
3  
 
However, reforms regarding monetary policy have lagged noticeably in their adoption 
among developing economies. Central bank independence, inflation targeting and other related 
policy reforms have only materialized in developing economies beginning in the mid-90s which 
coincides with the fall in volatility in this group of countries.
4 While structural changes, such as the 
increased openness, may have indeed helped economies become more stable, these changes must 
also include those related to monetary policy because the Great Moderation coincides with inflation 
control, suggesting that improved monetary policy has indeed played a major role.   
 
So, the relevant question is exactly how does monetary policy reduce the volatility of both 
output and inflation.  We know that there is a tradeoff between output volatility and inflation 
variability, and monetary policy attempts to manage this tradeoff optimally.  Policymakers have to 
decide how to reduce inflation to reach their goal.  If they react forcefully to any inflation deviation, 
the outcome will be low inflation volatility, but large output volatility.  Thus, in the long run, there 
is a tradeoff between inflation volatility and output volatility, although inflation has no effects on 
the full employment level of output. 
 
It is also possible to practice inefficient monetary policy, one which lags behind the 
output/inflation volatility frontier, making both of these inefficiently large.  Bernanke (2004) argues 
that in such a scenario of inefficient monetary policy, the volatility of both output and prices can be 
reduced by moving to better policies.  In other words, in the presence of an inadequate monetary 
policy, the outcome could be excessive volatility of output and inflation, and, hence, moving to an 
efficient policy can “shift the tradeoff to the origin” between output and inflation volatility, 
reducing both of them.  In other words, improvements in monetary management can allow reaching 
an efficient frontier.  
 
For example, a monetary policy that reacts insufficiently to changes in inflation, without 
fulfilling the Taylor principle, or a policy too optimistic on the full employment level of output, 
could end up generating unnecessary volatility and inflation.  These are reasonable explanations for 
the conduct of monetary policy in the US before the 1980s’ disinflation.  This policy inefficiencies 
could be even aggravated by a belief on a permanent unemployment/inflation tradeoff, leading 
potentially to Friedman’s accelerationist hypothesis. 
 
However, I want to emphasize the credibility bonus that comes with commitment to 
inflation stabilization.  In a standard Phillips curve framework, inflation depends on the output gap 
(the reason for the output/inflation volatility tradeoff), inflation expectations, and a set of other 
variables including inflationary shocks.  Let’s consider the case of low credibility in a low inflation 
objective.  In such a case, an inflationary shock may feedback into price and wage formation, 
requiring a more aggressive monetary policy response, and hence, making it costlier to reduce 
inflation.  This could happen when expectations are not only forward looking, but have a high 
degree of inertia, due to, for example, high levels of indexation or lack of credibility.  In contrast, 
                                                 
3 A similar point for the “good luck” hypothesis in the context of industrial countries has been made by 
Summers (2005).  He argues that the decline in volatility of growth was not synchronized among industrial 
countries given the common decline in oil prices.  Looking at developing countries makes this point even 
stronger, since it can also apply to inventory management and other forms of common productivity shocks 
since the asynchronicity is much more significant.  
4 Several industrial countries adopted inflation target regimes in the 90s, but they did it starting from an 
already stable macroeconomic environment.   4
when expectations are well-anchored to an inflation target, becoming also more forward looking, 
the monetary policy adjustment required to achieve stable and low inflation is milder and the 
sacrifice ratio declines, reducing the volatility of both inflation and output.
5 
 
Of course, achieving credibility is not an easy task and can be done through different 
avenues. Certainly the conquest of inflation, as occurred in developing countries, increases the 
belief in policymakers’ competence and commitment to controlled inflation.  This allows stable 
inflationary expectations and reduces inflation persistence.  An inflation target, with the necessary 
institutional support such as an independent central bank with a clear mandate to price stability, 
helps in this regard.  It establishes an explicit commitment to keep inflation low and stable through 
time, and a strategy to adjust to deviations, including the time horizon in which this will be 
achieved.  Indeed, among developing countries, those that adopted inflation targeting regimes have 
had lower inflation and output volatility than the rest (figure 3).  Of course, this evidence is only 
suggestive and the direction of the causality could be the reverse, with more stable economies being 
more prone to implementing an inflation targeting regime. The empirical evidence on this subject is 
mixed, but generally it has been found that inflation targeting does lower inflation and reduce its 
volatility.
6 There is some evidence for emerging economies that inflation targeting also reduces 
growth volatility (Gonçalves and Salles, 2008). 
 
 
Bad Luck is Back: The Risks of Inflation 
 
Recently, the world has faced one of the worst inflationary shocks in the last 60 years.  
First, it happened with oil prices, which started rising sharply at the beginning of the decade, and 
has climbed to record-high levels (figure 4).  However, even with this shock, inflation and output 
have been much less volatile than in previous oil price cycles.  Lower oil-dependence and 
countercyclical fiscal policy explain part of the milder effects. Better monetary policy has also 
contributed to substantially reduce the impact of oil shocks on output and activity.
7 However, the 
price of oil has kept increasing, and although its effects are smaller than in the past, the shock is 
becoming so large and persistent that it may have noticeable effects on inflation and output over the 
coming quarters.  On the bright side, however, the better monetary policy frameworks that are used 
today limit these effects. 
 
On the other hand, more recently, we have seen an impressive increase in food prices 
(figure 5), with serious inflationary effects in many countries. Food prices have reached in some 
cases their highest levels in history. This is mainly due to increased demand from emerging markets 
(especially China, India and oil-exporting countries), the use of grains as biofuels, and some 
financial factors as investors have increased their long positions in commodities. Since mid-2006 
grain prices, measured by the CRB index, have climbed at an annual rate of 56%, contrasting with 
the trend observed between 1990 and mid-2006, when prices increased around 0.5% per year. This 
is a common trend for other commodity prices. Wheat prices registered a reduction of around 1% 
between 1990 and mid-2006, and a rise of 121% since then, despite a partial reversion in the price 
during the last month. Similarly, rice prices, whose levels remained practically unchanged during 
                                                 
5 For a model on this issue see De Gregorio (2007). 
6 Truman (2003), Hyvonen (2004) and Vega and Winkelried (2005), among others. Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
show that the available evidence does not support this conclusion for developed economies. Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) corroborate this differentiated benefit, and conclude that the winners are emerging 
economies and converging-to-target ITers. Still, they conclude that the choice of the control group is key for 
finding any effect of IT on inflation. 
7 De Gregorio et al. (2007) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) show evidence supporting these views.   5
1990 and mid-2006, jumped to its peaks by increasing at annual rates of 71% since mid-2006. 
Finally, milk price, after falling at 0.3% per year during 1990-mid 2006, has increased at a 70% 
annual rate since then. 
 
The first-round price effects of the shock have been felt in sharp increases in foodstuff and 
energy while the rest of prices remain well behaved (figure 6).  For example, in Chile inflation 
hovers at about 8%, four points above the ceiling of our comfort zone (2 to 4%), mainly due to the 
rise in foodstuff and energy prices.  Indeed, non-food non-energy inflation is still close to 3%.  
Foodstuff prices have increased further due to weather problems (frosts in 2007 and drought in 
2008). 
 
The nature of these price hikes is purely international, or related to weather, making them 
unavoidable from the point of view of monetary authorities.  However, their potential propagation 
to other prices and wages through what we normally call second-round effects gives monetary 
policy an important role even in the presence of these specific external price shocks. Given the 
nature of the shock, driven to a large extent by biofuel production and food demand in fast-growing 
Asian countries, the shock is likely to persist for a long time. Some second-round effects are bound 
to happen, since price and wage formation always have some degree of inertia.  The role of 
monetary policy is to ensure that the adjustment of relative prices occurs without a persistent 
increase in inflation, that is, beyond normal dynamics.  Put differently, monetary policy must 
guarantee that the dynamic of prices is consistent with convergence of inflation to its objective, 
within the time horizon envisioned in the inflation target regime.   That is, monetary policy must 
worry about, and act upon, unstable dynamics that can lead to increases in inflation that may later 
be too costly to contain.  These are the undesired second-round effects that may require strong 
monetary policy actions. 
 
In a flexible inflation targeting regime, once there are deviations from the target, monetary 
policy is implemented on the basis of bringing back inflation projection towards the targeted level 
within a given time horizon. In Chile, this would mean bringing down projected inflation to 3% in 
the two year horizon. This length of the horizon takes into account the lags in the effects of 
monetary policy, as well as the fact that bringing back inflation to target has an output cost. It also 
allows for transitory shocks to undo their effects without shifting the path of monetary policy.  
Therefore, in the current context of sharp inflationary pressures, monetary policy must avoid 
undesired second-round effects, which are those that generate an adjustment longer than the one 
envisioned in the policy horizon. 
 
In order to monitor these potentially undesired second-round effects, we scrutinize price 
dynamics that appear to be out of the normal. For example, we follow the evolution of wages 
compared to an estimated evolution of wages based on the historical patterns of indexation.  If 
wages are growing faster than these estimates, we could be facing worrisome wage dynamics that 
may require a policy reaction. 
 
In this scenario, it could be argued that one could relax the policy horizon or the target level 
to accommodate these inflationary shocks with small output costs.  However, based on my previous 
discussion, this could be very detrimental for the future.  Giving up on inflation will lead to losing 
the inflation anchor on expectations, more backward- than forward-looking behavior of wage and 
price setters, and an increase in output volatility.  In other words, we would be achieving an 
inefficient outcome for monetary policy and losing the benefits of the Great Moderation. 
 
Hence, central banks must carefully monitor inflation expectations.  However, in the current 
juncture of extreme uncertainty and inflation volatility, the breakeven measures that compare   6
nominal and inflation protected securities appear to be excessively high world-wide, thus apparently 
showing an important increase in inflation expectations, which could even reflect the loss of the 
nominal anchor. This has also been the case in Chile, especially since the deepness of the market of 
inflation protected instruments tends to make them the natural safe haven.  Therefore, in uncertain 
times like the ones we are enduring today, breakeven measures may increase without necessarily 
implying un-anchoring expectations, making their timely recognition more intricate. 
 
Some could incorrectly argue that a way to avoid the monetary policy reaction to some 
specific inflationary shocks is to focus inflation control on core rather than headline measures of 
inflation.  This is a much debated issue, but in the context of the current discussion I would like to 
add that above the problem of doing the change in target in an opportunistic way and the impact it 
may have on credibility, there is a more profound reason why focusing on core versus headline 
inflation is not an issue in the current environment, where commodity prices have already increased 
substantially. In the present scenario, second-round effects appear in all prices.  For example, a 
rapid increase in wages, due to backward looking indexation or other type of inertia, will affect all 
prices through the cost channel, and hence, a pernicious dynamic of inflation will be noticeable in 
both headline and core inflation. Indeed, a reasonable adjustment should have foodstuff and energy 
price inflation falling sharply after the relative price adjustment has taken place, and core inflation 
adjusting from a higher level to the target.  Once food and energy prices level out, the propagation 
of inflation could be a more serious problem for countries that focus its target on core inflation.  
 
 
Challenges to Monetary Policy 
 
Current inflationary shocks pose a serious threat to monetary policy.  The recent adjustment 
has been uneven across countries.  Many have been trying to avoid the increase in prices via 
subsidies, taxes or plain price controls. However, it is by now clear that relative prices must adjust, 
given the persistency of the shock and the need for appropriate signals for efficient resource 
reallocation.  On the other hand, there are countries, such as Chile, where changes in costs are 
regularly passed on to consumer prices, because markets for foodstuff are globally integrated and 
competitive. Hence, a large part of the inflationary shock has been already absorbed.  However, we 
have continuously witnessed a flow of bad news on commodity prices, and inflationary shocks keep 
hitting us, but the benefits that the flexible inflation targeting regime brings in terms of price 
stability and credibility must be maintained. There is no doubt from the developing countries’ 
perspective that this is an important conquest and cannot be abandoned, least of all in these difficult 
times. 
 
The world economy is in a very complex situation.  It is far from the disastrous 1970s, but 
we are in the presence of a slowdown with high risks of inflation.  We are at a moment in which 
monetary policy is put under a serious stress test that will be crucial in identifying future 
refinements in the policy frameworks.  Particularly important in the US and industrial countries is 
the interaction between price and financial stability.  From a policymaker’s point of view, we must 
ensure that all the benefits achieved during the great moderation phase are preserved.  It would be 
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Note: Inflation was calculated using YoY \% change in consumer prices, given by IFS line 64. Growth was 
calculated as the YoY \% change in GDP volume as given by IFS line 99b. Averages are taken over all 
countries that have data available from 1975. Industrial and developing status of countries has been taken 
















































































Note: Inflation and growth have been calculated as in figure 1 over the same country groups. Volatility is 
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Note: Inflation has been calculated as in figure 1. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation, over a 
rolling window of five years. Countries were considered part of one group when more than 50% of the 






















Note: Price deflated by US Producer Price Index.  
Source: Bloomberg.   11
 
 

















CRB Spot Index CRB Fats &  Oils Sub-index
CRB Foodstuffs Sub-index Reuters-CRB Grains and Oilseeds Sub-index
 






Figure 6: Inflation: Food, energy and rest (annual change, percent) 
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